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I. INTRODUCTION 
Human stem cells, the most basic cells of the human body, have 
the unique ability to develop into more sophisticated cells and to re-
pair or replenish defective cells.1  Scientific research on human stem 
cells bears enormous potential because “when a stem cell divides, 
each new cell has the potential to either remain a stem cell or be-
come another type of cell with a more specialized function, such as a 
muscle cell, a red blood cell, or a brain cell.”2  Indeed, in 2000, the 
federal government announced for the first time its position that “the 
potential medical benefits of human . . . stem cell technology are 
compelling and worthy of pursuit in accordance with appropriate 
ethical standards.”3  Similarly, despite the relative uncertainty regard-
ing the potential advances derived from stem cell research, signifi-
cant data indicate that research advocates’ initial enthusiasm is justi-
fied.4
For purposes more relevant to this Comment, New Jersey’s law-
makers have declared that “human stem cell research offers immense 
 ∗ J.D. 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Communication Studies, 
2002, The College of New Jersey. 
 1 NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., STEM CELL 
INFORMATION: STEM CELL BASICS 1 (2006), http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/ 
info/basics/StemCellBasics.pdf. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Press Release, Nat’l Insts. of Health, NIH Publishes Final Guidelines for Stem 
Cell Research (Aug. 23, 2000), available at http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/aug2000/ 
od-23.htm [hereinafter NIH Publishes Final Guidelines]. 
 4 AUDREY R. CHAPMAN ET AL., STEM CELL RESEARCH AND APPLICATIONS MONITORING 
THE FRONTIERS OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 1 (1999), http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/ 
sfrl/projects/stem/report.pdf.  This report is “endorsed by the Board of Directors of 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science and by the Institute for 
Civil Society as a contribution to the public discussion of issues related to stem cell 
research and applications.”  Id. 
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promise for developing new medical therapies for . . . debilitating 
diseases and a critical means to explore fundamental questions of bi-
ology.  Stem cell research could lead to unprecedented treatments 
and potential cures for Alzheimer’s disease, cancer, diabetes, Parkin-
son’s disease and other diseases.”5  To that end, in January 2004, New 
Jersey became the second state (after California) to statutorily author-
ize stem cell research.6  In December 2005, New Jersey became the 
first state to publicly fund research of human embryonic cells, includ-
ing research on certain cell lines which is ineligible for federal fund-
ing.7  The state has committed $8.5 million in public funds to finance 
the research conducted at the Stem Cell Institute of New Jersey.8
Manifested by these legislative assurances, an underlying objec-
tive of New Jersey’s pioneer stem cell policy is also “[t]o encourage 
and enable the state’s renowned research and life sciences communi-
ties to develop quality, innovative treatments for patients.”9  Thus, al-
though New Jersey’s policy of encouraging stem cell innovation relies 
on these private entities, this Comment suggests that existing and 
pending New Jersey legislation and policy do not adequately clarify to 
whom the intellectual property rights belong in the case of publicly 
funded, but privately innovated, stem cell research.  This lack of clar-
ity may prove to be a disincentive that hinders the development of 
the anticipated breakthroughs expected of stem cell research. 
Part II of this Comment explains the science involved in stem 
cell research, then traces federal and state policies concerning that 
research, and concludes with a detailed description of New Jersey’s 
stem cell policy and legislation.  Part III then explains the intellectual 
property issues that arise in the context of publicly funded stem cell 
research programs and how these problems are likely to arise under 
New Jersey’s scheme.  Finally, Part IV evaluates legislative solutions 
designed to remedy similar problems in other arenas of publicly 
 5 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2Z-1(c) (West 2006). 
 6 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125300 (West 2004) (authorizing stem cell re-
search); see also 2003 N.J. Laws 203 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2Z-1 (West 
2004)); see also Ella Detrizio & Chris Brennan, The New Jersey Stem Cell Research Law, 3 
N.J. LIFESCITECH 8–9 (2004). 
 7 State of New Jersey Commission on Science & Technology, Stem Cell, http: 
//www.state.nj.us/scitech/stemcell/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2008) (discussing the Com-
mission’s awarding of grants totaling $5 million to seventeen research teams) [here-
inafter N.J. Sci. & Tech.]. 
 8 Stem Cell Institute of New Jersey, About the Institute, http://www2.umdnj. 
edu/scinjweb/about/index.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2008) (“The mission of the In-
stitute is to carry out research, training, and clinical studies on the application of 
stem cells to the treatment and cure of human disease.”). 
 9 Id. 
TULP_FINAL 6/12/2008  12:02:07 PM 
2008] COMMENT 1169 
 
funded innovation, ultimately contending that New Jersey has several 
options at its disposal to alleviate potential intellectual property dis-
putes that would otherwise hinder the development of stem cell re-
search.  
II. BACKGROUND OF THE SCIENCE BEHIND  
STEM CELL RESEARCH, FEDERAL POLICY, AND STATE POLICY 
A. Scientific and Technological Understanding 
The advent of human embryonic stem cell research can be 
traced to 1998, when Drs. James Thompson and John Gearhart each 
isolated and cultured human embryonic stem cells for research pur-
poses.10  Understanding the science behind stem cell research begins 
with the concept that “[t]he stem cell is the alpha cell of all cells.  Yet 
the stem cell is the most basic cell in the human body.”11  Researchers 
acquire stem cells from embryos that were fertilized in an in vitro fer-
tilization clinic and subsequently donated with the informed consent 
of the donor.12  “All stem cells—regardless of their source—have 
three general properties: they are capable of dividing and renewing 
themselves for long periods; they are unspecialized; and they can give 
rise to specialized cell types.”13  As they are unspecialized, stem cells 
cannot themselves perform specific cellular functions, such as pump-
ing blood or causing bodily movement, but they can bring about spe-
cialized cells, such as blood, nerve, or cardiac muscle cells, through a 
process known as differentiation.14
Scientists classify stem cells as belonging to one of three distinct 
types: totipotent, pluripotent, and multipotent.15  While both the 
totipotent and pluripotent cells have the potential to develop into 
 10 Heather L. Fowler, Note, Misapplied Ethical Considerations: U.S. Federal Stem Cell 
Mandates Lack Global Focus and Market Foresight, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 521, 523 (2004).  
It should be noted that Drs. Thompson and Gearhart, although employed by the 
University of Wisconsin and Johns Hopkins University, respectively, conducted this 
research in their individual and private capacities.  Id. 
 11 Carly Goldstein, Note, Dipping into Uncle Sam’s Pockets: Federal Funding of Stem 
Cell Research: Is It Legal?, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 229, 231 (2002) (citing NAT’L INSTS. OF 
HEALTH, STEM CELLS: A PRIMER (2000)).  That is, although the stem cell is the most 
basic of all human cells, it is considered the alpha cell because of its dominant effect 
on the future development of the body.  Id. 
 12 NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 1, at 6. 
 13 Id. at 4.  “Unspecialized” cells are cells that lack tissue-specific structures that 
enable them to execute any specialized functions.  Id.  “Specialized” cells, to the con-
trary, are structured to perform specific bodily functions.  Id.  
 14 Id. 
 15 Goldstein, supra note 11 (discussing CHAPMAN ET AL., supra note 4). 
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any cellular structure within the human body,16 only the totipotent 
stem cell—formed at the moment when the sperm fertilizes the 
egg—can develop into a fully functional organism.17  Conversely, as 
an already specialized stem cell, the ultimate development of the 
multipotent stem cell—cultivated from adult stem cells without much 
controversy—is limited to the certain tissue which it already com-
prises.18
As such, scientists believe that advances in stem cell research will 
lead to several medical breakthroughs because researchers can tap 
the substantial potential of stem cells prior to their ultimately limiting 
transformation into a specific body part.19  These anticipated break-
throughs include understanding the complexities of human devel-
opment, safer and more precise testing of new and experimental 
drugs, and, perhaps most importantly, cell-based therapies.  Such 
therapies include the creation of replacement tissues, renewable 
sources for organ transplants, and treatment of diseases and condi-
tions, including Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, diabetes, 
spinal cord injury, and many more.20
B. Federal Policy on Stem Cell Research 
Since the inception of stem cell research and technology, poli-
cymakers have wrestled with numerous ethical and moral concerns.21  
Most fundamentally, the ethical dilemma surrounding human em-
bryonic stem cell research is rooted in the issue of whether the cells 
are characterized as embryos or merely specialized body tissue.22  In 
order to make the taxing determination of whether stem cells are 
more analogous to somatic tissue rather than human embryos de-
pends largely on determining the potentiality of a cell—a cell’s po-
tential to become a person.23  Because technically any cell in the hu-
 16 Id. at 231–32. 
 17 Id. at 232. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Joanna K. Sax, The States “Race” with the Federal Government for Stem Cell Research, 
15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 5 (2006); see supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 20 NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 1, at 15. 
 21 See generally CHAPMAN ET AL., supra note 4. 
 22 Id. at 11 (“Although the answer to this question will be less important to those 
who believe that the early embryo has little or no moral status, it will shape the views 
of those who regard the embryo as significantly protectable.”).  This distinction is so 
crucial to the ethical determination because, depending on which perspective one 
subscribes to, the use of stem cells will either be deemed destruction of life or, less 
profoundly, morally acceptable scientific research—a debate that evokes many of the 
concerns associated with the abortion debate.  See id.  
 23 Id. 
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man body could become a person because of breakthroughs in clon-
ing, proponents of stem cell research have circumvented this possible 
obstacle by focusing their arguments on the natural propensity of 
embryonic stem cells to become a person.24  That is, “embryos have a 
natural potentiality to become a person in that the natural develop-
ment of an embryo, unlike tissue, is to become a human being.”25  
Thus, advocates of stem cell research liken stem cells to tissue and 
avoid the moral dilemmas traditionally associated with issues such as 
abortion or mammalian cloning.26
With these ethical concerns constantly at the forefront of the 
public discussion of stem cell research, policy regarding this technol-
ogy has by and large remained conservative.27  President Ronald 
Reagan prohibited federal funding of stem cell research through a 
moratorium that lasted throughout the 1980s.28  President Reagan ra-
tionalized his decision with the theory that embryonic and fetal re-
search would foment abortion and render taxpayers complicit in 
causing the death of fetuses.29  President George H.W. Bush pre-
served the moratorium, maintaining “the pro-life view that any ex-
perimentation on a fetus or embryo is equivalent to experimentation 
on a human being.”30
However, the tide began to shift in 1993 when, on his first day in 
office, President Bill Clinton lifted the existing moratorium that had 
prohibited fetal tissue research for the past decade.31  Effectively, 
President Clinton’s executive order provided the impetus for federal 
funding of embryonic and fetal research.32  Shortly thereafter, the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) Embryo Research Panel recom-
mended federal funding of embryo research.33
 24 See id. at 11–12. 
 25 Id. at 11. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See Goldstein, supra note 11, at 237–42; see also Fowler, supra note 10, at 523–25, 
538–43 (providing a more detailed account of the Clinton and G.W. Bush admini-
strations’ stem cell policies). 
 28 Nelle S. Paegel, Use of Stem Cells in Biotechnological Research, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 
1183, 1199 (2001). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Scott Davison, Influencing NIH Policy over Embryonic Stem-Cell Research: An Admin-
istrative Tug-of-War Between Congress and the President, 22 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. 
JUDGES 405, 410 (2002). 
 31 Memorandum on Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research, 29 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 87 (Jan. 22, 1993); see also Debra Rosenberg & Martha Brant, Taking Aim 
at Abortion, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 5, 2001, at 27. 
 32 Davison, supra note 30, at 410. 
 33 Eric Juengst & Michael Fossel, The Ethics of Embryonic Stem Cells—Now and For-
ever, Cells Without End, 284 JAMA 3180, 3182 (2000); see also Marjorie Shaffer, NIH 
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Accordingly, on October 3, 1995, President Clinton created the 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), a diverse panel of 
scientists and policymakers, and charged it with investigating the con-
troversial issues surrounding stem cell research.34  Ultimately, the 
NBAC made broad recommendations to permit federal funding of 
embryonic stem cell research.35  The essence of these recommenda-
tions was that the federal government should, under appropriate 
ethical standards, fund research using cells excised from existing ca-
daveric fetal tissue and research using cells that would otherwise be 
discarded after infertility treatments, but should not fund research 
using cells from embryos that were created (either by in vitro fertiliza-
tion or somatic cell nuclear transfer) solely for research purposes.36
In 1996, Congress limited the scope of federal funding used to 
support stem cell research with the Dickey Amendment, which is a 
rider to appropriations bills passed every year since its inception.37  
Through this enactment, Congress banned federal funding of: 
(1) [T]he creation of a human embryo or embryos for research 
purposes; or (2) research in which a human embryo or embryos 
are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury 
or death greater than that allowed for research on fetuses in 
utero. 
 . . .  (b) For purposes of this section, the term “human embryo or 
embryos” includes any organism, not protected as a human sub-
ject under [45 C.F.R. § 46] as of the date of the enactment of this 
Act, that is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning or 
any other means from one or more human gametes or human 
diploid cells.38
Panel Recommends Research on Human Embryos, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Oct. 3, 
1994, at 1. 
 34 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN STEM CELL 
RESEARCH (1999), http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/past_commissions/nbac_stem 
cell1.pdf. 
 35 Id. (“[I]n light of public testimony, expert advice, and published writings, we 
have found substantial agreement among individuals with diverse perspectives that 
although the human embryo and fetus deserve respect as forms of human life, the 
scientific and clinical benefits of stem cell research should not be foregone.”). 
 36 Id. at 65–81. 
 37 Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Ap-
propriations Act, H.R. 3043 110th Cong. § 509 (2008) (illustrating the most recent 
use of the language from the Dickey Amendment in the 110th Congress’s appropria-
tions legislation); see also Roger G. Noll, California’s Stem Cell Initiative: Converting the 
Legal and Policy Challenges: Designing an Effective Program of State-Sponsored Human Em-
bryonic Stem Cell Research, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1143, 1144 (2006). 
 38 H.R. 3043 § 509. 
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In 1998, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
declared that embryonic stem cells are incapable of developing into a 
human being,39 thereby expressly removing embryonic stem cell re-
search from the purview of the 1996 Congressional ban.40
Armed with this new declaration from the HHS, the NIH re-
leased new guidelines on August 23, 2000 to govern federally funded 
stem cell research.41  These guidelines reflect the NIH’s new policy 
that “the potential medical benefits of human pluripotent stem cell 
technology are compelling and worthy of pursuit in accordance with 
appropriate ethical standards.”42  In constructing this reformed pol-
icy, the NIH distinguished the 2000 Guidelines from the 1994 rec-
ommendations that were struck down by Congress.  The NIH’s dis-
tinction between stem cells derived for research purposes and those 
used for research purposes permit federally funded scientists to con-
duct research on existing stem cell lines, but not on cell lines created 
specifically for research purposes.43  Thus, since the cells themselves 
cannot be considered embryos, federally funded scientists are not 
forbidden from conducting research on them as long as these scien-
tists comport with certain conditions prescribed by the guidelines.44
 39 Research Using Stem Cells: Before the S. Appropriations Subcomm. on Labor, Health 
and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of 
Harold Varmus, Director of National Institutes of Health, Department of Health and 
Human Services), available at http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/statements/120298 
.asp; see also Kathi E. Hanna, Stem Cell Politics: Difficult Choices for the White House and 
Congress, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July–Aug. 2001, at 9. 
 40 Extracting stem cell research from the purview of the Dickey Amendment, of 
course, rests on a presumption in favor of the natural potentiality position discussed 
herein.  See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
 41 NIH Publishes Final Guidelines, supra note 3; see also Goldstein, supra note 11, 
at 248–50 (explaining that the NIH guidelines do not violate the Dickey Amend-
ment). 
 42 NIH Publishes Final Guidelines, supra note 3. 
[Further, t]he Guidelines prescribe the documentation and assurances 
that must accompany requests for NIH funding for research using hu-
man pluripotent stem cells from human embryos or fetal tissue.  The 
Guidelines state specific criteria for informed consent and establish a 
Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Review Group to review documentation 
of compliance with the NIH Guidelines.  In addition, the Guidelines de-
lineate areas of research involving human pluripotent stem cells that 
are ineligible for NIH funding. 
Id.  
 43 Goldstein, supra note 11, at 239 (citing Juengst & Fossel, supra note 33, at 
3183). 
 44 Id.; see also National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human 
Pluripotent Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51976, 51979–81 (Aug. 25, 2000).  Again, these 
conditions, in pertinent part, rest on the distinction between cell lines derived for 
research purposes and those used for research purposes. 
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In August 2001, President George W. Bush announced the cur-
rent federal executive policy permitting the use of federal funds 
solely for research on existing stem cell lines and creating a presiden-
tial council for monitoring developments in, and establishing guide-
lines for, stem cell research.45  Further, President Bush promised to 
veto any legislation that allows federal funding for: “(1) the deriva-
tion or use of stem cell lines derived from newly destroyed embryos; 
(2) the creation of any human embryos for research purposes; or (3) 
the cloning of human embryos for any purpose.”46  Therefore, the 
Bush policy effectively rejects the NIH Guidelines insofar as they pro-
scribe federal funding of stem cell research involving any stem cell 
lines other than those already in existence.47  The NIH—the govern-
ment’s leading organization on biomedical research—quickly fol-
lowed the President’s lead: 
[F]ederal funds may be awarded for research using human 
embryonic stem cells if the following criteria are met: The deriva-
tion process (which begins with the destruction of the embryo) 
was initiated prior to 9:00 P.M. EDT on August 9, 2001.  The stem 
cells must have been derived from an embryo that was created for 
reproductive purposes and was no longer needed.  Informed con-
sent must have been obtained for the donation of the embryo and 
that donation must not have involved financial inducements.48
C. States’ Policy on Stem Cell Research 
Notwithstanding federal restrictions on stem cell research, states 
have exercised their own discretion in forming their individual poli-
cies regarding the controversial technology.49  State policies “range 
from statutes in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York, which encourage embry-
onic stem cell research, to South Dakota’s law, which strictly forbids 
research on embryos regardless of the source.”50  As indicated by New 
Jersey’s and California’s policies, “some states so strongly believe in 
 45 Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research from Crawford, Texas, 37 PUB. 
PAPERS 32 (Aug. 13, 2001). 
 46 Press Release, The White House, President George W. Bush, Fact Sheet:  Em-
bryonic Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse 
.gov/news/releases/2001/08/print/20010809-1.html [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. 
 47 See id. 
 48 NIH’s Role in Federal Policy: Stem Cell Research, http://stemcells.nih.gov/ 
policy/NIHFedPolicy.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2008) (emphasis added). 
 49 See Sax, supra note 19, at 21–26. 
 50 Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, Stem Cell Research, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
programs/health/Genetics/embfet.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2008). 
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stem cell research, either for medical, political, or economic reasons, 
that they are willing to support research that the federal government 
is not willing to presently fund.”51  The most recent development in 
this nationwide debate was Missouri voters’ ratification of the Mis-
souri Stem Cell Research and Cures Initiative, essentially authorizing 
any stem cell research programs that meet the federal guidelines.52
While some states are still unwilling to authorize stem cell re-
search,53 California and New Jersey have taken the lead in legislatively 
permitting and declaring the benefits of stem cell research.54  Specifi-
cally, in becoming the first state to authorize stem cell research within 
its borders, California declared in 2002 “that research involving the 
derivation and use of human embryonic stem cells, human embry-
onic germ cells, and human adult stem cells, including somatic cell 
nuclear transplantation, shall be reviewed by a stem cell research 
oversight committee.”55
California’s policy determination is based on a number of find-
ings, such as the legislature’s conviction that “[s]tem cell research of-
fers immense promise for developing new medical therapies for these 
debilitating diseases and a critical means to explore fundamental 
questions of biology. Stem cell research could lead to unprecedented 
treatments and potential cures for diabetes, Alzheimer’s disease, can-
cer, and other diseases.”56  Furthermore, scientific advancement and 
medical breakthroughs were not the only sparks for this revolutionary 
policy: 
 51 Sax, supra note 19, at 20. 
 52 MO. CONST. art. III, § 38(d)(1)–(2). 
To ensure that Missouri patients have access to stem cell therapies and 
cures, that Missouri researchers can conduct stem cell research in the 
state, and that all such research is conducted safely and ethically, any 
stem cell research permitted under federal law may be conducted in 
Missouri, and any stem cell therapies and cures permitted under 
federal law may be provided to patients in Missouri, subject to the 
requirements of federal law and [certain named limitations and 
requirements]. 
Id. § 38(d)(2).  
 53 See, e.g., Paul Smaglik, Stem-Cell State Lines, 429 NATURE 905, 905 (2004) (dis-
cussing Missouri’s (currently outdated) and Kansas’s specific bans on stem cell re-
search). 
 54 CAL. CONST., art. XXXV, amended by Proposition 71 (2004) (funding stem cell 
research); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125290.10 (West 2004); CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 125300 (West 2006) (authorizing stem cell research); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 26:2Z-1, -2 (West 2004); see also infra Part II.D. 
 55 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125300. 
 56 Id. § 125300(d). 
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California’s biomedical industry is a critical component of the 
state’s economy that provides employment in over 2,500 compa-
nies to over 225,000 Californians, pays $12.8 billion in wages and 
salaries, invests more than $2.1 billion in research, and reports 
nearly $7.8 billion in worldwide revenue, and would be signifi-
cantly diminished by limitations imposed on stem cell research.57
Following New Jersey’s commitment to fund the technology,58 
the voters of California passed Proposition 71, which created the Cali-
fornia Institute for Regenerative Medicine (CIRM)59 and expressly al-
located “an average of $295 million per year in bonds over a 10-year 
period to fund stem cell research and dedicated facilities for scientists 
at California’s universities and other advanced medical research fa-
cilities throughout the state.”60  Proposition 71 also established the 
Independent Citizen’s Oversight Committee (ICOC),61 a twenty-nine 
member board comprised of experts from public and private Califor-
nia universities, non-profit and for-profit medical research firms, and 
disease research advocacy groups, to govern the CIRM.62  Moreover, 
as one of the principal authors of Proposition 71 argued, the high 
costs of funding stem cell research will be offset by the gains enjoyed 
by California due to the economic growth expected from the promise 
of the technology.63
As it stands, despite the fervor with which Proposition 71 was en-
acted and promoted, the awarding of research grants has been tem-
pered by litigation brought by challengers of the decision to fund the 
grants through general obligation bonds.64  Consequently, in an ef-
 57 Id. § 125300(f). 
 58 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2Z-1(f).  
Open scientific inquiry and publicly funded research will be essential 
to realizing the promise of stem cell research and maintaining this 
State’s leadership in biomedicine and biotechnology.  Publicly funded 
stem cell research . . . offers the most efficient and responsible means 
of fulfilling the promise of stem cells to provide regenerative medical 
therapies. 
Id. 
 59 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125290.10. 
 60 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 71 (West). 
 61 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125290.15. 
 62 Id. § 125290.20(a). 
 63 Sax, supra note 19, at 23 (citing Connie Bruck, Hollywood Science, NEW YORKER, 
Oct. 18, 2004, at 70 (discussing how Robert Klein, a California real estate mogul and 
author of Proposition 71, proposed funding the Institute)). 
 64 See Press Release, California Institute for Regenerative Medicine, Appellate 
Court Sets Hearing for Stem Cell Litigation (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://www. 
cirm.ca.gov/press/pdf/2007/01-18-07.pdf (explaining plaintiffs’ appeal from lower 
court’s ruling that funding through general obligation bonds is constitutional and 
not in violation of any statutes or government oversight duties). 
TULP_FINAL 6/12/2008  12:02:07 PM 
2008] COMMENT 1177 
 
fort to encourage the policy despite the obstacles presented by this 
litigation, Governor Schwarzenegger ordered a $150 million loan in 
August 2006, largely provided by a fund comprised of money from 
private philanthropists and organizations, allowing CIRM to presently 
solicit proposals for grants.65
Other states have since followed California’s and New Jersey’s 
lead by at least authorizing, if not also funding, stem cell research.66  
For instance, in 2005, the Connecticut General Assembly established 
its Stem Cell Research Fund which, not unlike California, consists of 
“not less than ten million dollars . . . for grants-in-aid to eligible insti-
tutions for the purpose of conducting embryonic or human adult 
stem cell research,”67 for a ten-year period that began in June 2006.68
Similarly, following a 2005 executive order signed by Governor 
Blagojevich,69 Illinois maintains that it “is at the forefront of stem cell 
research as the first Midwest state, and only the fourth state in the na-
tion, to commit public dollars to support this ground-breaking sci-
ence.”70  Upon creating the Illinois Regenerative Medicine Institute 
(IRMI), Governor Blagojevich transferred ten million dollars in 
budget funds to the program.71  Subsequently, the IRMI awarded its 
first grants in April 2006, and the health department has appropri-
ated five million dollars from its budget to the stem cell research 
program for fiscal year 2007.72
Taking a smaller but no less significant step, the Indiana General 
Assembly authorized Indiana University to “establish an adult stem 
cell research center.”73  Thus far, Indiana has allocated fifty thousand 
dollars toward establishing the center.74  In 2006, the Maryland Gen-
 65 Press Release, California Institute for Regenerative Medicine, $181 Million 
Headed for Stem Cell Institute (Nov. 20, 2006), available at http://www.cirm.ca.gov/ 
press/pdf/2006/11-20-06.pdf; see also Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Discussion 
of Executive Action to Strengthen Stem Cell Research (July 21, 2006), available at 
http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/speech/2538/. 
 66 See generally Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, supra note 50 (providing a concise 
summary and chart of state legislation and executive orders permitting and funding 
stem cell research). 
 67 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-32e(c) (2005). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Exec. Order No. 2005-6, Executive Order Creating the Illinois Regenerative 
Institute for Stem Cell Research (July 12, 2005). 
 70 Illinois Regenerative Medicine Institute, About IRMI, http://www.idph.state.il. 
us/irmi/about.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2006). 
 71 Exec. Order No. 2005-6, supra note 69; see also Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, 
supra note 50. 
 72 Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, supra note 50. 
 73 IND. CODE ANN. § 21-45-4-1 (West 2007). 
 74 Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, supra note 50. 
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eral Assembly adopted a similar program when it established the 
Maryland Stem Cell Research Fund, to distribute grants for research 
conducted on adult and embryonic stem cells.75  Maryland has allo-
cated fifteen million dollars for the Stem Cell Research Fund for fis-
cal year 2007.76
Seeking a more developed and expansive policy, the Massachu-
setts legislature enacted two statutory provisions demonstrating the 
state’s interest in fostering stem cell research.77  The first establishes a 
“biomedical research advisory council”78 that combines the efforts 
and experiences of several officials from the state’s department of 
health and the University of Massachusetts Medical School.79  The 
second provision announces that: 
[T]he purpose of this chapter is to establish a life sciences center  
. . . intended to: (i) promote the best available research in life sci-
ences disciplines through diverse institutions and to build upon 
existing strengths in the area of biosciences in order to spread the 
economic benefits across the commonwealth; and, (ii) foster im-
proved health care outcomes in the commonwealth and the 
world.80
The latter provision also provides funding for the program with the 
Life Sciences Investment Fund.81  It is important to note, however, 
that the general court enacted these provisions after overriding Gov-
ernor Romney’s veto of the proposed pro-stem cell research legisla-
tion.82
Hesitant states (yet willing nonetheless) continue to contemplate 
stem cell research, enacting limited legislation that gradually demon-
 75 MD. ANN. CODE art. 83A, § 5-2B-03 (2006). 
 76 Id.; see also Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, supra note 50. 
 77 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111L, § 9 (LexisNexis 2006); id. ch. 23I, § 1(8)–(9). 
 78 Id. ch. 111L, § 9(a). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. ch. 23I, § 1(8)–(9). 
 81 Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, supra note 50. 
The second establishes a life sciences center to promote life sciences 
research in advanced and applied sciences, including but not limited to 
stem cell research, regenerative medicine, biotechnology, and 
nanotechnology and creates the Life Sciences Investment Fund to 
make appropriations, allocations, grants or loans to leverage develop-
ment and investments in stem cell research and other areas.  
$10,000,000 was appropriated to the fund. 
Id.  
 82 Id. 
TULP_FINAL 6/12/2008  12:02:07 PM 
2008] COMMENT 1179 
 
strates such states’ readiness to permit the controversial experimenta-
tion.83  In sum: 
     Even though the federal government is not funding laborato-
ries that want to establish new stem cell lines, public money is still 
being used to promote this research at the state level.  Research-
ers wishing to engage in frontier science have limited choices.  
They can either attempt to solicit private funding at the institute 
where they currently research or move to a state with a commit-
ment to funding the research.84
D. New Jersey’s Stem Cell Research Policy 
New Jersey passed legislation in January 2004 authorizing and 
encouraging stem cell research.85  “The New Jersey bill allows all types 
of stem cell research[,] . . . sets up an institutional review board to re-
view stem cell research, and states that information will be presented 
to infertility patients about their options to donate unused embryos 
to research.”86
A major catalyst for New Jersey’s “proclamation”87 was the state’s 
recognition that “[t]he biomedical industry is a critical and growing 
component of New Jersey’s economy, and would be significantly di-
minished by limitations imposed on stem cell research.”88  In view of 
that, in May 2004, New Jersey became the first state to publicly fund 
stem cell research when Governor James McGreevey signed legisla-
tion that established “the nation’s first state-supported stem cell re-
search facility.”89  In addition, during his term as Acting Governor of 
New Jersey, Richard Codey issued an executive order “solidifying New 
Jersey’s position as a scientific leader through the creation of a public 
umbilical cord and placental blood bank for use in stem cell re-
 83 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 43.350.005 (2006) (setting up a rather open ended 
scheme by which the Washington State Legislature discusses the benefits of stem cell 
research and authorizes a life sciences discovery fund that may result in future grants 
for stem cell research); see also The Christopher Reeve Stem Cell Research Fund, VA. 
CODE ANN. § 23-286.1 (2006) (authorizing a fund consisting of money to “be used 
solely to support medical and biomedical stem cell research conducted in Virginia 
institutions of higher education that relates to the causes and cures of disease,” but 
not specifically providing any money for the fund). 
 84 Sax, supra note 19, at 25–26. 
 85 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2Z-1, -2 (West 2006); see also Detrizio & Brennan, supra 
note 6. 
 86 Sax, supra note 19, at 21; see generally N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2Z-1, -2. 
 87 Jeremy Pearce, Entering a Brave New World, Warily, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at 
14NJ1. 
 88 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2Z-1(e). 
 89 David Kocieniewski, McGreevey Signs Bill Creating Stem Cell Research Center, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 14, 2004, at B5. 
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search.”90  This measure entrusts all the research and financing to the 
Stem Cell Institute, instead of spreading the funds throughout the 
state like California’s Proposition 71;91 it also encourages New Jersey 
scientists to collaborate with researchers from around the world.92
New Jersey took another step as a pioneer in funding stem cell 
research in December 2005 when its Commission on Science and 
Technology granted five million dollars to seventeen New Jersey edu-
cational, nonprofit, and corporate research teams for cutting-edge 
exploration of potential cures and treatments for devastating and de-
bilitating conditions.93  Governor Jon Corzine approved legislation 
that allocates $270 million to construct and equip several stem cell 
research laboratories throughout the state.94  However, New Jersey’s 
efforts to fund the cutting edge research suffered an unexpected set-
back in November 2007, when voters rejected a measure that would 
have allowed the state to borrow up to $450 billion over the next ten 
years to fund stem cell research.95  Notwithstanding this interruption 
to New Jersey’s momentum, the remainder of this Comment focuses 
on the intellectual property implications that are likely to arise as 
New Jersey continues to remain at the forefront of stem cell research. 
 90 Press Release, New Jersey Office of the Governor, Codey Announces Pioneer-
ing Stem Cell Research Initiative (Oct. 18, 2005), available at http://www.nj.gov 
/cgi-bin/governor/njnewsline/view_article.pl?id=2780. 
 91 See CAL. CONST. art. XXXV, amended by Proposition 71 (2004); CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 125290.10 (West 2006); see also supra notes 60–65. 
 92 State of New Jersey Commission on Science & Technology, The Stem Cell In-
stitute of New Jersey, http://www.state.nj.us/scitech/stemcell/institute (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2008) [hereinafter N.J. Stem Cell Inst.]; see also CAL. CONST. art. XXXV, 
amended by Proposition 71 (2004); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125290.10; see also 
supra notes 60–65. 
 93 N.J. Sci. & Tech., supra note 7 (“In December 2005 the Commission awarded 
the Ellie Katz Umbilical Cord Blood Program and the Coriell Institute for Medical 
Research $350,000 each to create the nation’s first public cord and placental blood 
bank for stem cell research.”).  
 94 N.J. Stem Cell Inst., supra note 92.  
 95 Terrence Dopp, New Jersey Rejects Stem-Cell Bonds in “Big Defeat,” 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 7, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=206010 
87&sid=azGJAFWSMcjs&refer=home. 
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III. SIDE EFFECTS OF PUBLICLY  
FUNDED STEM CELL RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND THEIR  
LIKELY MANIFESTATION IN NEW JERSEY 
A. Intellectual Property Implications Encountered Under Other Publicly 
Funded Stem Cell Research Programs 
“[B]ecause [stem cell] research will most likely proceed under 
some combination of federal, state, local, non-profit and private for-
profit funding sources, the ownership rights will be anything but 
clear.”96  That is, unlike the simplest scenario, in which a private 
company is the sole source of funding for its own research, and con-
tractual provisions govern most potential intellectual property dis-
putes with employed scientists, problems may, and often do, arise in 
the context of state entities funding scientific research.97
Generally, the addition of any source of funding—whether state, 
corporate, or private grant, for example—only further complicates 
the already hazy question of intellectual property ownership.98  Yet, 
unfortunately, it is unlikely that the confusion surrounding intellec-
tual property rights in the arena of stem cell research will lead to 
strictly private funding, as the requisite amount of funding will hardly 
be procurable from one source.99
The official scholarly rebuttals to California’s Proposition 71, re-
leased in the election materials shortly before the state-wide vote on 
the measure, best crystallize the murky intellectual property implica-
tions arising under state-funded stem cell research programs.100  “The 
Argument Against Proposition 71 . . . focused largely on the ‘boondog-
gle’ aspects of the measure, including a lack of accountability, closed-
door meetings, and the funneling of a staggering amount of money 
 96 Sean M. O’Connor, Intellectual Property Rights and Stem Cell Research: Who Owns 
the Medical Breakthroughs?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 665, 666 (2005). 
 97 Id. at 667–68 (explaining that private companies employing innovative work-
forces attempt to avoid such problems with explicit contractual provisions; however, 
in a situation where a state-funded university uses those funds to finance a researcher 
and his lab, “any patentable inventions that the researcher invents in the course and 
scope of his employment with the university must be assigned to the university”). 
 98 E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (demonstrating copyright issues arising in 
work-for-hire contexts); see O’Connor, supra note 96, at 668–69; see also DONALD S. 
CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 72 n.3 (3d ed. 2004) 
(explaining similar concerns germane to patent law). 
 99 See O’Connor, supra note 96, at 670. 
 100 See ATT’Y. GEN., PROPOSITION 71: OFFICIAL TITLE AND SUMMARY, at 72–73, avail-
able at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov04/prop_71_entire.pdf; see also 
O’Connor, supra note 96, at 676–79. 
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to ‘corporate research’ that would ultimately result in windfall profits 
to private corporations.”101
For example, Mitch Kapor, a renowned software developer102 
who serves as President and Chair of the Open Source Applications 
Foundation,103 applied the aforementioned critiques to the intellec-
tual property context of Proposition 71 in a letter that was widely dis-
seminated days before the vote.104  Of Kapor’s myriad concerns,105 the 
most germane to this Comment asserts that Proposition 71 will give 
rise to ownership disputes between the private venture capitalists who 
will fund the research and the scientists who will conduct it.106  Ironi-
cally, Proposition 71 evinces this distressing ambiguity in its own pro-
vision addressing the intellectual property issues: 
[A]ll grants and loan awards [are] subject to intellectual property 
agreements that balance the opportunity of the State of California 
to benefit from the patents, royalties, and licenses that result from 
basic research, therapy development, and clinical trials with the 
need to assure that essential medical research is not unreasonably 
hindered by the intellectual property agreements.107
At least one commentator has argued that such language leaves 
the intellectual property issues entirely too unresolved.108  “In the ab-
stract this [statutory provision] sounds reasonable and desirable 
enough.  But, the devil is in the details: Proposition 71 essentially 
hands off determination of the correct balance and the means to ef-
fectively achieve that balance to the brand new and untested 
 101 O’Connor, supra note 96, at 676–77 (citing ATT’Y. GEN., supra note 100, at 73). 
 102 Mitchell Kapor, Biography, http://www.kapor.com/bio/index.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 6, 2008). 
     He is widely known as founder of Lotus Development Corporation 
and the designer of Lotus 1-2-3, the “killer application” which made the 
personal computer ubiquitous in the business world in the 1980’s.  He 
has been at the forefront of the information technology revolution for 
a generation as an entrepreneur, investor, social activist, and philan-
thropist. 
Id.  
 103 Open Source Applications Foundation, http://www.osafoundation.org/ (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2008) (“OSAF is a non-profit organization working on Chandler Pro-
ject, a personal information manager designed for small group collaboration.”). 
 104 Posting of Chris Nolan, Just Say “No” Says Mitch, POLITICS FROM LEFT TO RIGHT, 
http://www.chrisnolan.com/archives/000577.html#more (OCT. 26, 2004, 10:00 
PST). 
 105 See id.  Kapor’s concerns regarding Proposition 71 range from the potential for 
conflicts of interest, to insufficient accountability provisions, to the familiar ethical 
considerations routinely debated nationwide.  Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125290.30(h) (West 2004). 
 108 O’Connor, supra note 96, at 678–79. 
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ICOC.”109  The crux of this concern is that “Californians were asked 
to vote blindly for a $3 billion investment gambit whose IP rights and 
return on investment rules and procedures have yet to be established 
in any effective or binding manner.”110
Comparing the unease created by Proposition 71 and the ICOC 
to the context of such blind-faith investing of taxpayers’ dollars in 
cutting-edge research, one reporter hypothesized: 
     Imagine that a partnership of scientists and Hollywood moguls 
urged you to invest in a promising but controversial field of medi-
cal research. 
     The partnership would control how your money is spent, based 
on recommendations from appointed “working groups” whose 
meetings would be kept secret from you. 
     Would you accept such a deal?  Probably not.111
Thus, without an effective intellectual property structure in 
place clearly allocating intellectual property rights before the prom-
ise of stem cell research is realized, “the nightmare tussles over own-
ership and control will begin . . . [and] [t]his clamor will increase 
proportionally to the success of the therapies.”112  That is, “stem cell 
research will be a victim of its own success”113 when public access is 
obstructed by either a chilled incentive for researchers because of an 
unfair share in ownership, or exorbitant prices for the therapies that 
arise from the work of innovators with too much private control.114
B. Manifestation of Intellectual Property Implications Likely to Arise 
Under New Jersey’s Stem Cell Research Policies 
New Jersey’s stem cell research policy, although motivated by the 
desire to spark innovation and maintain the state’s status as a bio-
medical leader,115 is ominously quiet regarding allocation of intellec-
tual property rights.116  While New Jersey expressly recognizes impor-
tant governing principles of its stem cell research policy including 
“standards of open scientific exchange, peer review[,] and public 
 109 Id. at 678. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Stuart Leavenworth, The Opaque Petri Dish, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 9, 2005, at E1. 
 112 O’Connor, supra note 96, at 689. 
 113 Id. at 687. 
 114 Id. at 687–89. 
 115 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2Z-1(f) (West 2006) (“Open scientific inquiry and publicly 
funded research will be essential to realizing the promise of stem cell research and 
maintaining this State’s leadership in biomedicine and biotechnology.”).  
 116 See id.; see also N.J. Sci. & Tech., supra note 7. 
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oversight,”117 the state’s purported aspirations such as “develop[ing] 
innovative treatments for patients and generat[ing] economic oppor-
tunity and job growth in New Jersey”118 fail to provide any assurances 
to the innovators that they will receive adequate ownership rights.119  
As such, despite these good intentions, New Jersey’s stem cell re-
search policy may regrettably suffer the consequences that the 
aforementioned critics of California’s Proposition 71 predicted.120
Such infirmities are present throughout New Jersey’s statutes, as 
well as in other substantive policy statements, evidencing the poten-
tial for intellectual property murkiness.121  Primarily, in its apparent 
mission statement, New Jersey declares its stem cell initiative’s com-
mitment to “advance New Jersey’s position as a leader in scientific re-
search . . . encourage . . . innovative treatments . . . support ground-
breaking research . . . [and] generate economic opportunity and job 
growth.”122  Of course, in the United States, such goals are best 
achieved “by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective . . . Discoveries.”123
Despite this vagueness, New Jersey has at its disposal two meas-
ures that at least provide a foundation upon which to build an ade-
quate intellectual property scheme.124  First, unlike the relative silence 
throughout the statutes authorizing stem cell research,125 the Stem 
Cell Research Grant Program expressly provides that “[r]ecipient or-
ganizations will be required to share with the State of New Jersey a 
percentage of any income received from the intellectual property 
that might be developed with the State’s grant support.”126  While this 
“guarantees that the state will receive a direct financial benefit from 
any commercial licensing,”127 it does little to clarify the quantity of 
that benefit, or what portion of the commercial benefits the grantee 
 117 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2Z-1(f). 
 118 N.J. Sci. & Tech., supra note 7. 
 119 See id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2Z-1, -2 (West 2006). 
 120 See supra Part III.A. 
 121 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2Z-1, -2; N.J. Sci. & Tech., supra note 7. 
 122 N.J. Sci. & Tech., supra note 7 (emphasis added). 
 123 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 124 See State of New Jersey Commission on Science & Technology, Stem Cell Re-
search Grant Program, http://www.state.nj.us/scitech/stemcell/grants/faqs.html 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Stem Cell Research Grant Program]; State of 
New Jersey Commission on Science & Technology, Entrepreneur Assistance, 
http://www.state.nj.us/scitech/entassist/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2008) [hereinafter En-
trepreneur Assistance]. 
 125 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2Z-1, -2. 
 126 Stem Cell Research Grant Program, supra note 124. 
 127 Id. 
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can expect; yet it at least provides a starting point within the statutory 
framework. 
Within New Jersey’s intellectual property toolbox is its Edison 
Innovation R&D Fund (“Edison Fund”).128  The Edison Fund was de-
signed to fund companies involved in early, high-risk stages of scien-
tific and technological research and development.129  Pertinent to this 
Comment, a main goal of the Edison Fund is to “increase[] the 
amount and value of intellectual property”130 created by such compa-
nies.  Underlying the Edison Fund are the familiar goals to “pro-
mote[] collaboration between universities and companies . . . and 
grow[] technology businesses in New Jersey”131—further evidence of 
New Jersey’s commitment to remain a leader in biotechnology. 
Unlike the concerns presented by the aforementioned poli-
cies,132 the Edison Fund materials provide some quantitative guidance 
as to royalty distribution using language similar to that of the Stem 
Cell Research Grant Program, but taking it one step further: 
The Commission shall receive a percentage of royalty payments 
from any intangible property awarded to the grantee awarded as-
sistance from the Commission and which assistance led to the 
awarding of the intangible property pursuant to New Jersey Stat-
utes, P.L. 2005, c.272  as follows: 
• 1% of net sales resulting from IP developed under the 
grant—up to the original amount of the grant. 
• 1% of royalty payments received by the company for li-
censing IP developed under the grant—up to 10 times 
the original amount of the grant[.]133 
Under this administrative scheme, the Edison Fund caps the maxi-
mum amount of royalties payable to the State by the innovator at ten 
times the amount of the original grant, thereby providing clear 
guidelines for allocation of royalties to all interested parties.134
Nevertheless, all regulation of stem cell research in New Jersey 
falls under the rubrics of the Stem Cell Institute of New Jersey and 
the Stem Cell Research Grant Program because the Edison Fund is 
primarily a competition-encouraging mechanism designed to foster 
 128 Entrepreneur Assistance, supra note 124. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See supra Part III.A. 
 133 STATE OF N.J. COMM’N ON SCI. & TECH., EDISON INNOVATION R&D FUND 
APPLICATION GUIDELINES 5 (2007), available at http://www.state.nj.us/scitech/pdf/ 
entassist/edisonrdguidelines07.pdf. 
 134 Id. 
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technological innovation by private companies that may or may not 
collaborate with a state research institution.135  Consequently, the Edi-
son Fund’s unique clarity regarding intellectual property rights and 
royalty allocation can presently serve in no more than an advisory ca-
pacity. 
In attempting to discern their intellectual property rights when 
funded by these programs, researchers must look to existing New Jer-
sey intellectual property law applicable to work funded by the state’s 
science and technology grant program.136  Not surprisingly, this provi-
sion offers a quantitatively nebulous explanation of allocation of in-
tellectual property rights to royalties: 
[The New Jersey Commission on Science and Technology] shall 
have authority to receive a percentage of royalty payments from 
any intangible property . . . awarded to any science and technol-
ogy company that received assistance from the commission and 
which assistance led to the awarding of the intangible property 
[in exchange for certain financial and other obligations.]137
Thus, while New Jersey’s intentions, coupled with foundational 
intellectual property plans, provide a benevolent and fertile envi-
ronment in which to develop the state’s budding stem cell research 
frontier, the state needs specific and clear provisions addressing these 
issues.  “This crisis, and its concomitant challenge to the social order 
and existing IP ownership structure, must be averted by taking pro-
active measures now.  In fact, some sorting and planning of owner-
ship claims that correspond to funding sources can be effected today 
for new stem cell research initiatives.”138
 135 Entrepreneur Assistance, supra note 124.  “The Edison Innovation R&D Fund 
will provide grants on a competitive basis.”  Id.  “Companies are encouraged to part-
ner with any New Jersey PhD granting universities or with any company or institution 
with primary business location in New Jersey.”  Id.  Moreover, to be eligible, compa-
nies must be “[o]rganized as a C Corp or an LLC.”  Id.; see also supra Part II.D. 
 136 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:9X-9 (West 2006).  Thus, in crafting a regulatory 
scheme for state-funded stem cell research, New Jersey lawmakers cannot simply rely 
on the Edison Fund to govern these concerns since it only affects state institutions if 
they are partnered with an eligible “lead company.”  See supra note 135 and accom-
panying text. 
 137 Id. § 52:9X-9(u).  That is, the Commission does little to provide notice to po-
tential innovators regarding the actual amount of royalties they should expect to 
share with the state.  See Stem Cell Research Grant Program, supra note 124.  While 
this seems to leave open only the question of the amount of royalties, other, more 
comprehensive, policy regimes demonstrate that there are a number of other con-
cerns—including surrendering, relaxing, and guaranteeing certain rights—that must 
be addressed by a successful policy.  See infra Part IV. 
 138 O’Connor, supra note 96, at 666. 
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IV. APPLICATION OF OTHER LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY SCHEMES: 
TOWARD A PROPOSAL TO AVOID CONFLICT IN NEW JERSEY 
As suggested above, New Jersey must delineate clearer guidelines 
regarding intellectual property rights as the state begins to realize the 
burgeoning potential of stem cell research.  New Jersey’s policies re-
garding budding technologies such as stem cell research—with all the 
benefits that it promises—should provide more clarity rather than 
simply acknowledging that the state will receive some indefinite per-
centage of the income generated through intellectual property royal-
ties.  This clarity should come in the form of not only a precise royalty 
distribution framework, but also a satisfactory balance of rights and 
compromises between innovators and the state in exchange for both 
parties’ surrendering of certain exclusivities. 
Accordingly, while these measures are a significant starting 
point,139 this Comment advocates that learning from other legislative 
and policy schemes will provide valuable assistance in addressing this 
problem.  These schemes are California’s Intellectual Property Policy 
for Non-Profit Organizations,140 the National Science Foundation’s 
(NSF) grant policy141 governed by the Bayh-Dole Act,142 and the Fed-
eral Orphan Drug Act.143
A. CIRM’s Intellectual Property Policy for Non-Profit Organizations 
As New Jersey’s chief fellow pioneer on the frontier of stem cell 
research, CIRM functions as the west coast equivalent to the Stem 
Cell Institute of New Jersey.  As such, California’s policy addressing 
these issues is of particular significance.  In pertinent part, CIRM’s 
policy declares its “core principles”144 to be: “1. Ownership; 2. Broad 
Sharing; 3. Research Exemption; 4. Licensing; [and] 5. March-in 
rights.”145
 139 See supra Part II.B. 
 140 CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY FOR NON-
PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (2006), http://www.cirm.ca.gov/policies/pdf/ippnpo.pdf. 
CIRM is also developing a separate policy applicable to for-profit organizations.  Id.   
See also supra Part III.A. 
 141 Policies and Procedures for Inventions and Patents Resulting from Grants, Co-
operative Agreements, and Contracts, 45 C.F.R. § 650 (1982); see also NAT’L SCI. 
FOUND., GRANT POLICY MANUAL 95–102 (2005), http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/manuals/ 
gpm05_131/gpm05_131.pdf; infra Part III.B. 
 142 Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended 
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–210 (2000)); see also infra Part IV.B. 
 143 Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa–ee (2000) (originally enacted as Pub. L. 
No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983)). 
 144 CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., supra note 140, at 22. 
 145 Id. at 22–23. 
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These provisions allow all grantees of CIRM funds to own the in-
tellectual property arising from the Institute’s financing, while en-
couraging a liberal sharing policy throughout the scientific and edu-
cational communities.146  Although the owner-inventors will maintain 
ownership of all intellectual property, certain patented inventions will 
remain freely available to California research institutions.147  Such 
grantees of CIRM funds “are expected to negotiate non-exclusive li-
censing agreements where possible . . . to encourage the successful 
commercial development of the invention into products and services 
that can benefit the public.”148  In an effort to balance the ownership 
interests of the inventors with CIRM’s public welfare interests, the 
policy provides a march-in rights provision, which grants CIRM the 
ability to practically apply a patented invention when the inventor 
demonstrates underutilization of licensing amounting to waste.149
Thus, as a state with a comparable policy and attitude concern-
ing stem cell research, New Jersey would be well-served to implement 
a similar intellectual property policy.  The California policy “is in-
tended to meet the dual goals of academic openness and the need to 
bring scientific advances to the public via commercialization” while 
also “facilitate[ing] the commercialization of CIRM-funded discover-
ies without impeding the progress of stem cell research.”150  This in-
tellectual-property-geared language seems strikingly consistent with 
New Jersey’s goals for its stem cell research program: 
New Jersey’s stem cell research initiative is committed [t]o ad-
vanc[ing] New Jersey’s position as a leader in scientific research 
and bring[ing] the benefits of stem cell research to New Jersey 
residents[; t]o encourage[ing] and enable[ing] the state’s re-
nowned research and life sciences communities to develop qual-
ity, innovative treatments for patients[; t]o support[ing] ground-
breaking research that contributes to the understanding of stem 
cells and their potential and the translation of such research to 
patient treatment[; and t]o generat[ing] economic opportunity 
and job growth in New Jersey by accelerating commercialization 
 146 Id. at 22. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 23. 
 149 Id. at 23, 37–38. 
Prior to exercising march-in rights, CIRM must determine that such ac-
tion is necessary because of the failure of the grantee organization or 
its licensees to take effective steps to achieve practical application of 
the inventions in a particular field of use, to satisfy health or safety 
needs, or to meet requirements for public use. 
Id. at 37.   
 150 CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., supra note 140, at 4–5. 
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of new therapies and new technologies related to stem cell re-
search.151
Thus, as the Stem Cell Institute of New Jersey formulates its in-
tellectual property policy, it should consider what CIRM, its co-
pioneer in the arena of stem cell research, has adopted in California.  
Such a clear description of ownership rights, coupled with even 
clearer royalty allocation language as that found in New Jersey’s Edi-
son Fund,152 demonstrates an ideal foundation on which to build a 
suitable intellectual property framework. 
B. The NSF Grant Policy and the Bayh-Dole Act 
As the main governmental agency charged with funding scien-
tific innovation with federal money,153 the NSF is an ideal reference 
point from which New Jersey can model its intellectual property poli-
cies regarding stem cell research.  In 1982, the NSF updated its regu-
lations governing inventions and patents borne from NSF-granted 
federal funds.154  The impetus for this policy revision was the NSF’s 
objective to align its treatment of such intellectual property with the 
governmental interests set forth in the Federal Bayh-Dole Act.155
With the passage of Bayh-Dole, Congress sought to strike a bal-
ance—similar to that envisioned by this Comment—by altering the 
federal patent policy in order to reconcile the government’s owner-
ship interest with that of fostering modern technological innova-
 151 N.J. Sci. & Tech., supra note 7. 
 152 Supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 153 National Science Foundation, http://nsf.gov/about/ (last visited Mar. 17, 
2008). 
The National Science Foundation . . . is an independent federal agency 
created by Congress in 1950 “to promote the progress of science; to ad-
vance the national health, prosperity, and welfare; [and] to secure the 
national defense . . . .”  With an annual budget of about $6.06 billion, 
[the NSF is] the funding source for approximately 20 percent of all 
federally supported basic research conducted by America's colleges and 
universities. 
Id.  
 154 National Science Foundation Patent Policy, 45 C.F.R. § 650.2 (2000). 
 155 Id.  “The regulation replaces all current NSF patent regulations and brings 
NSF patent policies and procedures into compliance with the Bayh-Dole Act.  The 
policies and procedures set forth apply to all grants and cooperative agreements 
awarded by the Foundation since July 1, 1981 . . . .”  Id.; see also NAT’L SCI. FOUND., 
supra note 141, at 95.  “The disposition of rights to inventions made by small business 
firms and non-profit organizations, including universities and other institutions of 
higher education, during NSF-assisted research is governed by . . . the Bayh-Dole 
Act.”  Id.  
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tion.156  As a practical matter, the Bayh-Dole Act served to grant “uni-
versities and small businesses the right to own their inventions made 
with federal funds.”157  The provisions set forth by Bayh-Dole provide 
valuable insight to New Jersey as such a regulatory scheme seems to 
be a healthy approach to realizing governmental aspirations while 
balancing the interests of award grantees.158
More specifically, Congress struck this balance by granting cer-
tain minimum rights to the government while simultaneously impos-
ing certain requirements on grantees, namely businesses and univer-
sities.159  For instance, regarding governmental rights, Bayh-Dole 
requires that all such funding contracts include a clause granting the 
government a paid-up license to use the patented invention.160  Un-
der this provision, neither the government nor any of its contractors 
could be held liable for patent infringement for the use of an inven-
tion it funded.161  Another notable benefit afforded the government 
under Bayh-Dole is Congress’s grant of march-in rights, whereby the 
government—as a matter of right—may require the grantee to li-
 156 See Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000).  Congress used language that echoes 
New Jersey’s goals for its stem cell policy, as well as the goals contemplated in this 
Comment. 
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to 
promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or 
development; . . . to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organiza-
tions and small business firms are used in a manner to promote free compe-
tition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery; 
. . . to ensure that the Government obtains sufficient rights in federally supported 
inventions to meet the needs of the Government and protect the public 
against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 157 John H. Raubitschek, Responsibilities Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 87 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 311, 311 (2005).  Large business became subject to certain 
provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act when Congress amended the act in 1984.  See Bayh-
Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 210 (2000). 
 158 See, e.g., Raubitscheck, supra note 157, at 311. “Under the Bayh-Dole Act, uni-
versities have been very successful in commercializing their inventions.  According to 
surveys by the Association of University Technology Managers . . . , universities 
earned over $1 billion in royalties annually from FY 2000[–2003].”  Id. 
 159 See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–210; see also Raubitschek, supra note 157, at  
311–18. 
 160 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4). 
 161 Raubitschek, supra note 157, at 312.  Further, “[t]he Government’s rights may 
be expanded to cover other governments as are necessary to meet obligations under 
any treaty, international agreement or memorandum of understanding.”  Id. (citing 
§ 202(c)(4) of the Bayh-Dole Act). 
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cense a patent when the grantee has not sufficiently commercialized 
the invention or when the grantee’s conduct amounts to waste.162
On the other side of the balance, a major result of Bayh-Dole 
was the granting of absolute ownership of, and other rights regard-
ing, their federally funded inventions to grantees.163  President 
Reagan’s Memorandum on Government Patent Policy of 1983, an 
early example of these benefits, made clear the need for “waiving 
some of the Government’s rights and the contractor’s obligations 
under [Bayh-Dole] to obtain a uniquely or highly-qualified contrac-
tor.”164
Similarly, Bayh-Dole was sure to alleviate any concern that the 
government’s enumerated rights would apply even if only a minimal 
amount of government funds were used in conceiving the inven-
tion.165  That is, in order for the government to exercise its rights, 
“the funds must have been used in either the conception or first ac-
tual reduction of practice.”166  While superficially Bayh-Dole seems to 
grant more rights to the government, there are relatively minimal as-
surances that government funds will not be abused, as they are gen-
erally subject to the plenary interest of the Act—granting ownership 
to and fostering innovation within the scientific community. 
To that end, the NSF revamped its own intellectual property pol-
icy in order to “better serve the purposes of [Bayh-Dole] or the inter-
ests of the United States and the general public.”167  At the very mini-
mum—in situations where the grantee has elected not to retain title 
in his NSF-funded invention168—“[t]he grantee will retain a nonex-
clusive royalty-free license throughout the world in each subject in-
vention to which the Government obtains title, except if the grantee 
fails to disclose the subject invention within [the time specified by the 
 162 35 U.S.C. § 203.  While the necessity to exercise march-in rights has proved to 
be rare, see Raubitschek, supra note 157, at 312–13 (referencing, e.g., Johns Hopkins 
Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998)), it nevertheless provides the 
government with peace of mind when issuing the grant, while simultaneously pre-
senting a significant incentive for the grantee to make the most of his federal fund-
ing and resulting innovation. 
 163 Raubitschek, supra note 157, at 311. 
 164 Memorandum on Government Patent Policy, 1983 PUB. PAPERS 248, 252 (Feb. 
18, 1983).  This particular grant of flexibility was arguably weakened by the 1984 
amendment to the Act, which subjected the rights of large businesses to the govern-
ment’s license and march-in rights.  See Raubitschek, supra note 157, at 311. 
 165 See Raubitschek, supra note 157, at 313. 
 166 Id. 
 167 National Science Foundation Patent Policy, 45 C.F.R. § 650.2(a) (2006). 
 168 Id. § 650.4(e)(1). 
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NSF policy].”169  Similarly, “[i]f an awardee elects not to retain rights 
to an invention, the Foundation will allow the inventor to retain the 
principal patent rights unless the awardee . . . shows that it would be 
harmed by that action.”170  Thus, unlike New Jersey’s existing stem 
cell research policy, the NSF policy first sets forth a minimum level of 
protection for all NSF-funded innovators.171
Further, the NSF’s adaptation of Bayh-Dole to its patent policy 
provides guidance regarding greater grantee rights, which could 
prove to be a useful starting point for New Jersey when crafting a 
clearer intellectual property policy: 
The grantee may retain the entire right, title, and interest 
throughout the world to each subject invention subject to the 
provisions of this Patents Rights clause and [Bayh-Dole].  With re-
spect to any subject invention in which the grantee retains title, 
the Federal Government shall have a nonexclusive, nontransfer-
able, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for 
or on behalf of the United States the subject invention through-
out the world.172  
Although this provision173 and the remainder of the NSF policy174 
do not offer any specific royalty allocation guidelines, the NSF’s pol-
icy, coupled with appropriate language such as that of New Jersey’s 
Edison Fund,175 would serve as a constructive aid to New Jersey poli-
cymakers as they develop a clear intellectual property policy for state-
funded stem cell research. 
C. The Orphan Drug Act 
A third regulatory scheme—and more of an example of what 
happens when proper incentives are not in place than a substantive 
policy template—that New Jersey should consider in forming its intel-
lectual property policy for its stem cell initiative is the Orphan Drug 
Act, a federal law enacted over twenty years ago in order to remedy 
private industry’s failure (due to an insufficient market) to produce 
drugs for rare diseases (“orphan drugs”).176  Congress enacted the 
Orphan Drug Act in 1983 because pharmaceutical companies could 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. § 650.2(c). 
 171 See supra Part III.B. 
 172 45 C.F.R. § 650.4(b). 
 173 See id. 
 174 See generally id. § 650. 
 175 See supra notes 128–34 and accompanying text. 
 176 Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa–ee (2000). 
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not afford to develop drugs for rare diseases due to the inherently 
small market for such drugs.177  Through this Act, Congress hoped to 
create financial incentives to ensure that pharmaceutical companies 
would develop treatments for these diseases to which such little atten-
tion had been paid in the past.178
To that end, the Orphan Drug Act sets forth several incentives 
for innovators who invent cures for rare diseases.  These incentives 
are largely financial in nature and include exclusive licensing, tax 
credits, federal funding for clinical trials and research, and other 
grants for developers of orphan drugs.179
The significance of an incentive program like the Orphan Drug 
Act is evident in its results.  In the decade leading up to passage of 
the Orphan Drug Act the FDA approved only ten orphan drugs.180  
Conversely, since its enactment nearly 300 orphan drugs have re-
ceived FDA approval.181  “The response to the Orphan Drug Act is an 
example of how favorably the industry responds to increased intellec-
tual property protection that lowers the risk of investing in research, 
development, and marketing of a new drug.”182
New Jersey should consider the Orphan Drug Act not so much 
as an intellectual property policy template,183 but rather as an exam-
ple of the power of properly established policy incentives.  That is, if 
innovators clearly understand any control the state would have via 
standard agency or work-for-hire principles, especially with an intel-
lectual property incentive system working in their favor, then they are 
more likely to continue developing stem cell technologies. 
 177 Id. § 360ee(b)(2)(B).  The benefits conferred by the Act apply to treatments 
for “any disease or condition [for] which there is no reasonable expectation that the 
cost of developing and making available in the United States a drug for such disease 
or condition will be recovered from sales in the United States of such drug.”  Id. 
 178 Id. § 360ee(a) (authorizing the Secretary of the Food and Drug Administration 
to “make grants to and enter into contracts with public and private entities and indi-
viduals” in order to defray the costs of the testing and development of treatments for 
rare diseases).  
 179 Id.; see also Mandy Wilson, Note, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection: More Generic 
Favored Legislation May Cause Pioneer Drug Companies to Pull the Plug on Innovation, 90 
KY. L.J. 495, 502–04 (2002). 
 180 Wilson, supra note 179, at 503. 
 181 Marlene E. Haffner, Adopting Orphan Drugs—Two Dozen Years of Treating Rare 
Diseases, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 445, 445 (2006).  “In the 24 years since this law was 
passed, 282 such drugs and biologic products” have been approved.  Id. 
 182 Id. at 503. 
 183 See supra Part IV.A–B. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
New Jersey certainly has a proud tradition as a worthy leader and 
pioneer in the frontier of biomedical research.184  However, with such 
an accolade comes substantial responsibility.  Indeed, a foundational 
principle of American law is that the optimal way “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, [is to secure] for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries.”185  Thus, there is a recognized government ob-
ligation to craft policy that ensures not only appropriate distribution 
of ownership rights, but also a fertile marketplace in which public 
and private innovation can thrive together. 
In undertaking this most integral governmental obligation, New 
Jersey would be well-advised to consider—and in some cases, emu-
late—the aforementioned regulatory schemes.186  At the very mini-
mum, New Jersey has at its disposal the Edison Innovation R&D 
Fund, a regulatory scheme that provides necessary clarity in royalty 
distribution.187  By adapting this concrete designation of royalty 
amounts to the stem cell research policy, New Jersey lawmakers would 
eliminate the risk of deterring potential innovators who would prefer 
to conduct their potentially life-saving research in a state that pro-
vides them with adequate notice of how much income they can ex-
pect to share.  This would not be a particularly onerous or difficult 
first step considering the relatively small percentage of royalties that 
the Edison Fund guarantees to the state.188
As the various policies discussed herein demonstrate, however, 
the bare minimum is not sufficient.  It simply is not enough that New 
Jersey’s existing policy vests title in the intellectual property of stem 
cell technology to the innovators by merely requiring innovators “to 
share with the State of New Jersey a percentage of any income re-
ceived from the intellectual property that might be developed with 
the State’s grant support.”189  The appropriate regulatory regime 
would, for example, qualify this required sharing of royalties with 
guarantees that the government will not be able to claim its percent-
 184 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2Z-1 (West 2006). 
 185 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 186 See supra Part IV; see also Entrepreneur Assistance, supra note 124. 
 187 Entrepreneur Assistance, supra note 124. 
 188 STATE OF N.J. COMM’N ON SCI. & TECH., EDISON INNOVATION R&D FUND 
APPLICATION GUIDELINES, supra note 133, at 6.  “1% of net sales resulting from IP de-
veloped under the grant—up to the original amount of the grant.  1% of royalty 
payments received by the company for licensing IP developed under the grant—up 
to 10 times the original amount of the grant.”  Id. 
 189 Stem Cell Research Grant Program, supra note 124. 
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age merely because it provided some fraction of the funding that may 
have led to a major, perhaps even unforeseen, advance several years 
later.  As such, the NSF Grant Policy, governed by the Bayh-Dole 
Act,190 provides particularly useful guidance through a clause requir-
ing that the conception or first application of the technological ad-
vance be at least partially attributable to the state’s funds before the 
government can claim its due percentage of royalties.191
At the same time, of course, an ideal policy would recognize the 
importance of the government interests as well.  For instance, CIRM’s 
Intellectual Property Policy for Non-Profit Organizations192 reflects 
such interests by guaranteeing free availability of state-funded ad-
vances to other California research institutions, despite the fact that 
the owner-inventors will maintain ownership of all intellectual prop-
erty.193  New Jersey’s intellectual property policy on stem cell research 
should include a march-in rights provision similar to that provided by 
CIRM.194  That is, if the private innovator—who maintains ownership 
of the intellectual property—wastes such ownership by underutilizing 
his licensing rights, then the Stem Cell Institute of New Jersey can 
step in to ensure public benefit from the medical breakthrough.  
Thus, while New Jersey’s policy seems to provide such intellectual 
property ownership to innovators,195 a more thorough policy would 
protect the public and governmental interests while balancing these 
interests with those of the private innovator. 
Therefore, a thorough intellectual property policy scheme that 
takes into account the interests of all involved parties is an absolutely 
essential element to adequate government regulation of state-funded 
scientific research.  As the Orphan Drug Act illustrated, government 
failure to establish the proper environment to develop innovation 
can have dire consequences.196  Thankfully, New Jersey lawmakers 
have taken an important first step by recognizing the immeasurable 
potential of stem cell research.197  To tap into that potential in the 
most productive and responsible manner, however, New Jersey must 
learn from the past, as well as the present treatment of such tech-
 190 See supra Part IV.B. 
 191 See supra note 165–66 and accompanying text. 
 192 See supra Part IV.A. 
 193 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 194 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 195 See supra Part II.D. 
 196 See supra Part IV.C. 
 197 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2Z-1(c) (West 2006). 
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nologies by its contemporaries, such as California and the federal 
government. 
By proclaiming that New Jersey’s status as a biomedical leader 
“would be significantly diminished by limitations imposed on stem 
cell research,”198 and creating the first state-funded stem cell research 
facility in the United States, New Jersey has undoubtedly obligated it-
self to provide a suitable market for the development of this technol-
ogy.  New Jersey has thus far taken positive steps toward encouraging 
and funding this groundbreaking research.199  However, the state 
must recognize the potentially devastating effects of an unsatisfactory 
intellectual property policy.  Upon making this recognition, New Jer-
sey should take account of existing legislative and regulatory regimes 
that are instructive to a government that must adapt its intellectual 
property policies to cutting-edge technology.200
[T]he pitch of the ownership battle will rise proportionally to the 
success rate of the research.  Thus, the more we achieve the 
vaunted promises of stem cell research, the more a crisis will be 
precipitated over the ownership of its results. . . . [B]ecause 
greater certainty in the investment environment almost always 
draws more investment because the risks are more easily calcu-
lated . . . we could then get back to the truly important mission at 
hand—creating an environment in which the miracles latent in 
stem cell research can be realized for the benefit of human-
kind.201
 Presumably, Thomas Jefferson would not have commissioned 
Lewis and Clark without first assuring them that it would be their 
names, along with his, that would be remembered for revealing the 
bounty of the Louisiana Territory.  Likewise, New Jersey cannot af-
ford to withhold such crucial assurances from the scientists on whom 
the state will rely to maintain its coveted status as a leader in this bur-
geoning scientific frontier.   
 198 Id. § 26:2Z-1(e). 
 199 See supra Part II.D. 
 200 See supra Part IV. 
 201 O’Connor, supra note 96, at 666, 714.   
